

## RECORD OF THE SENATE

**TUESDAY, JULY 25, 2000**

### OPENING OF THE SESSION

*At 3:27 p.m., the Senate President, Hon. Franklin M. Drilon, called the session to order.*

**The President.** The second session of the Third Regular Session of the Eleventh Congress is hereby called to order.

Let us all stand for the opening prayer to be led by Sen. Robert Z. Barbers.

*Everybody rose for the prayer*

### PRAYER

**Senator Barbers.**

Lord Jesus, we come to You in our need, create in us an awareness of the massive forces of conflict that threaten our country today and grant us a sense of urgency to activate the forces of goodness, of justice, of love, of peace and of reconciliation.

Where there is armed conflict, especially in Mindanao, let us stretch out our arms to our brothers and sisters.

Where there is abundance, let there be simple lifestyle and sharing.

Where there is poverty, let there be dignified living.

Where there is destruction, let there be repair and rehabilitation.

Where there is selfish ambition, let there be humble service.

Where there is injustice, let there be atonement.

Where there is despair, let there be hope in the good news.

Where there are wounds of division, let there be unity and wholeness.

Help us to be committed to the building of Your kingdom:

Not seeking to be cared for, but to care.

Not expecting to be served, but to place ourselves in the service of others.

Not aspiring to be materially secure, but to place our security in Your love.

Teach us Your Spirit for it is only in loving imitation of You, Lord, that we can discover the healing springs of life that will bring hope for the world.

Mama Mary, Queen of Peace, pray for us and our brothers and sisters in Mindanao.

We ask this through our Lord Jesus Christ Who lives with the Father in union with the Holy Spirit, one God forever and ever.

Amen.

**The President.** The Secretary will please call the roll.

### ROLL CALL

**The Secretary, reading:**

Senator Teresa Aquino-Oreta .....	Present
Senator Robert Z. Barbers .....	Present
Senator Rodolfo G. Biazon .....	*
Senator Renato L. <i>Compañero</i> Cayetano ..	Present
Senator Anna Dominique M.L. Coseteng ..	Present
Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago .....	Present
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile .....	Absent**
Senator Juan M. Flavio .....	Present
Senator Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. ....	Present
Senator Gregorio B. Honasan .....	Present
Senator Robert S. Jaworski .....	Present
Senator Loren B. Legarda-Leviste .....	Present
Senator Ramon B. Magsaysay Jr. ....	Present
Senator Blas F. Ople .....	*
Senator John Henry R. Osmeña .....	*
Senator Sergio R. Osmeña III .....	Present
Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel Jr. ....	Present
Senator Ramon B. Revilla .....	Present
Senator Raul S. Roco .....	*
Senator Vicente C. Sotto III .....	Present
Senator Francisco S. Tatad .....	*
The President .....	Present

**The President.** With 16 senators present, there is a quorum.

\* On official mission

\*\* On account of illness

**The President.** Is there any objection? *[Silence]* There being none, the motion is approved.

# BILL ON SECOND READING

## S. No. 2038—Anti-Injunction Act of 2000 (Continuation)

**Senator Sotto.** Mr. President, I move that we resume consideration of Senate Bill No. 2038 as reported out under Committee Report No. 239.

**The President.** Is there any objection? *[Silence]* There being none, resumption of consideration of Senate Bill No. 2038 is now in order.

**Senator Sotto.** Mr. President, we are still in the period of interpellations. May I ask that the sponsor, Sen. Renato L. Compañero Cayetano, be recognized, and to continue her interpellation, Sen. Miriam Defensor Santiago.

**The President.** The principal sponsor, Sen. Renato L. Compañero Cayetano, is recognized, and to interpellate, Sen. Miriam Defensor Santiago.

**Senator Defensor Santiago.** Mr. President, will the gentleman yield for clarificatory interpellation considering that I support this bill?

**Senator Cayetano.** Yes, Mr. President. With great honor and much delight.

**Senator Defensor Santiago.** Thank you, Mr. President. I previously said that I support this bill, and I would like to enumerate the reasons:

No. 1. It is consistent with the view of no less than the Supreme Court itself which on June 25, 1999 issued an administrative circular, entitled "Exercise of Utmost Caution, Prudence and Judiciousness in Issuance of Temporary Restraining Orders and Writs of Preliminary Injunction."

Thus, to repeat, the bill is consistent with the world view taken on this matter by no less than the Supreme Court, the apex of our judicial system.

The second reason I support this bill is that it appears to me to be the proper response to widespread public demand for expeditious procedures concerning public works.

The third reason I support this bill is that it prevents a possible source of corruption in the judiciary. It is common knowledge among trial practitioners that sometimes there are

occasions when judges sell TROs. That is to say, for the proper bribe, a judge will issue a TRO regardless of the public interest involved.

Having said that, I would now like to proceed with the clarificatory questions. I would like to go through the pages chronologically. I will refer to Section 4 on page 2 of the bill. This is the section which sets out the procedures for acquisition of land or other real property, including expropriation.

We all know in the legal profession that expropriation proceedings are covered by Rule 67 of the *Rules of Court*. I think it is self-evident that Section 4 seeks to revise Rule 67 of the *Rules of Court*.

I believe that this debate has already been settled, but I will request the considered wisdom of the sponsor on this point: Is this section intended to amend *Rules of Procedure* promulgated by the Supreme Court? If so, what is the legal basis for this amendment on the part of the Legislature?

**Senator Cayetano.** I thank the lady senator for that clarificatory question.

Yes, Mr. President, to a certain extent, Section 4 would amend the provisions of the *Rules of Court* vis-a-vis on expropriation. I realize that the statement of the lady senator from Iloilo City and the Philippines is really relevant to this particular provision.

I am also aware that the Supreme Court in the *Echegaray* case has apparently made a ruling that only the Supreme Court has the exclusive jurisdiction of amending the *Rules of Court*.

The legal basis for this Section 4 which would, as I said, partly amend the *Rules of Court* on expropriation is the considered opinion of one of the members of the Constitutional Commission, no less than now Dean Joaquin Bernas of the Ateneo Law School where, in his book, he explained rather clearly that despite the absence of legislative power on amending the *Rules of Court* or *Rules of Procedure*, that nevertheless, the legislative body has an equal power to amend the *Rules of Procedure*.

With the permission of the lady senator, may I read into the *Record* the portion of the comment of Dean Joaquin Bernas. This is on page 871 of his book, *The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary*, 1996 edition, where he said, and I quote:

In the end, Commissioner Aquino struck a compromise which omitted any mention of the power

of the Legislature, but with the understanding that the silence of the text would nevertheless be recognition of the inherent power of the court to make rules and of the equally inherent power of the Legislature to legislate on matters of court procedure.

That, Mr. President, is the legal basis for Section 4 of this bill which, as I said, effectively amends certain portions of the *Rules of Court* on expropriation.

**Senator Defensor Santiago.** Thank you, Mr. President. That happens to be the view. I take the point as well that although the *Rules of Court* are promulgated by the Supreme Court, nonetheless subsequently, the Legislature may exercise legislative power by amending those rules.

In other words, the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate *Rules of Procedure* as provided for in our Constitution does not inhere exclusively only to the Supreme Court. That, in effect, there are two agencies in our government with power to amend the *Rules of Court*. The first is the Supreme Court; and the second is the Congress of the Philippines.

I hope that I am expressing the consensus of this Chamber on that point. And I would like to place on record that I have placed my own personal position on this matter in my book called *Rules of Court Annotated*.

**Senator Cayetano.** Mr. President, I am quite ecstatic with the statement of the lady senator from Iloilo City. In fact, I have a copy of her book.

Let me also put on record that she did also express the same opinion as that of the opinion that I mentioned as far as Dean Joaquin Bernas is concerned.

**Senator Defensor Santiago.** Mr. President, the gentleman professes to be ecstatic about this legal point. I must say that ecstasy is an emotion that is not familiar to me but all the same is welcome at this time.

I am still on Section 4...

**Senator Cayetano.** Thank you, Mr. President. Actually, I was expressing some emotions of some of my colleagues during certain times of the day. *[Laughter]*

**Senator Defensor Santiago.** I am still in Section 4 which provides that the "implementing agency shall make a deposit with the Court in the amount of (a) fifty percent (50%) of the estimated value of the land based on the latest relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue; and (b) fifty

percent (50%) of the estimated value of the structures and improvements based on the fair market value as stated in the current tax declaration."

I am concerned that this provision might impose what might constitute an unreasonable and onerous burden on the implementing agency which will be tasked with the production of the required funds for these required deposits.

Therefore, the corollary question which I now raise will be: Where will the implementing agency get the funds?

**Senator Cayetano.** Mr. President, first of all, no less than the President of the Republic, if I am not mistaken, in Section 1 of his Administrative Order No. 50 dated 17 February 1999, has, in fact, required that the purchase price of right-of-way easement of property for expropriation should be an amount equivalent to 10 percent higher than the zonal value of the said property.

My interpretation of this, as part answer to the question of the lady senator, is that no less than the President of the Republic realizes that the present valuation under the *Rules of Court*, which is based on assessed value, is certainly detrimental to the landowners whose land may be taken by appropriation.

Now, it may well be true that this might create a lot of burden for the implementing agency. But what is important here, Mr. President, is, for the first time, we are now giving the landowners what is the real value of his land that is going to be expropriated, and that will be on the basis of the zonal valuation by the Bureau of Internal Revenue or in the absence thereof, what we call the "fair market value".

In Republic Act No. 7718 where there is effectively a provision on built-in projection cost, the sources of the funds will be from the General Appropriations Act, Mr. President. But with respect to the other infrastructure projects, I will confess, I am at a loss where the implementing agency will really get this kind of funding.

**Senator Defensor Santiago.** May I know if the bill has an appropriation clause or an appropriation section?

**Senator Cayetano.** Mr. President, there is none except when it comes to the relocation of squatters which is found in Section 5, page 3, where the fund for the building of relocation sites shall come from appropriation under the General Appropriations Act.

**Senator Defensor Santiago.** In view of the fact that the executive branch of government seems to have already

expressed prior consent of and support of this bill, would it not be preferable to include an appropriation clause in the measure rather than trust the Executive to provide for funding during the drafting of the next General Appropriations Act?

**Senator Cayetano.** With that observation, Mr. President, I will be most happy to hear the amendment of the lady senator from Iloilo City at the proper time to ensure that the funds for the implementing agency is present in the General Appropriations Act.

**Senator Defensor Santiago.** Perhaps the technical working group might also be instructed to study the possibilities of enumerating the potential sources of the funds that will be contemplated by the appropriation clause.

**Senator Cayetano.** Yes, Mr. President. The sponsor takes note of the helpful suggestions of the lady senator from Iloilo City.

**Senator Defensor Santiago.** That was a policy question.

I would now like to raise a point of law still on Section 4. Section 4 provides that in case the land is occupied by squatters, the court shall issue a writ of demolition for the purpose of dismantling any and all structures found in the subject property. The provision imposes a mandatory duty on the court to issue the writ.

Since the obligation imposed on the judiciary is mandatory in nature, logically, this means that the judge sitting on the case would have no room for the exercise of discretion since the law makes the issuance of the writ mandatory. Is that the contemplation? In other words, I will rephrase the question. Does this provision not take away from judges the discretion normally given by the *Rules of Court* in the issuance of processes?

**Senator Cayetano.** Mr. President, the discretion still lies with the court because as to be noted in the beginning of that paragraph on line 14, "Upon receipt of the said deposit, the Court shall immediately issue to the said government implementing agency a "Writ of Possession", et cetera.

Mr. President, this is basically also the language of Rule 67 of the *Rules of Court* that upon deposit of the necessary amount, the court shall allow, upon the filing of the complaint and the proper deposit, under Section 2 of Rule 67, the plaintiff has the right to enter or take possession of the land. In that sense, there is a discretion, yes, in determining whether the deposit is sufficient or not. Once the court has determined that the deposit is sufficient, then it has no other choice but to issue the writ of possession which, as I said, is really a restatement in another form of Section 2, Rule 67, of the *Rules of Court*.

**Senator Defensor Santiago.** Mr. President, may I just restate this for the record since I am in accord with what the distinguished sponsor has just said.

When Section 4 provides that upon receipt of the said deposit, the court shall immediately issue to the said government implementing agency a writ of possession for the property, this means that the court virtually no longer possesses discretion for as long as the court has determined that the next preceding paragraph has been complied with. That paragraph concerns the deposit with the court.

As soon as the matter of the deposit has been investigated and found to be appropriately implemented by the court, then it no longer has any discretion. It must immediately issue the writ of possession.

Will the distinguished sponsor concur with this interpretation?

**Senator Cayetano.** Yes, I concur, Mr. President.

**Senator Defensor Santiago.** Thank you, Mr. President.

My more important question on this legal point is this: Since Section 4 intends that the court shall have mandatory—not discretionary but mandatory—obligation to issue the writ of possession as soon as the question of deposit has been settled, might Section 4 not run counter to another existing law which is RA No. 7279 known by its short title as "Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992," specifically Section 28 subtitled "Eviction and Demolition"?

Section 28 of that law provides: "Eviction or demolition as a practice shall be discouraged." May I please know: How can we reconcile Section 28 of the Urban Development and Housing Act with Section 4 of our instant bill?

**Senator Cayetano.** Mr. President, I would like to thank the lady senator from Iloilo City for bringing up that point.

First of all, we are looking here at a situation where there is in fact no squatter involved as far as this piece of land, subject matter of the expropriation, is concerned.

With respect to lands where there are squatters, whether these are government lands or privately owned, there will be no automatic writ of possession even though the amount of deposit has been approved by the court because there is still a requirement that there should be relocation sites. However, if this law contradicts the so-called Lina law, it will definitely repeal the Lina law in the event that such contradiction or inconsistency exists.

**Senator Defensor Santiago.** Mr. President, repeals are always disfavored. So may I suggest a possible way of reconciliation between these two provisions.

Under Section 28 of the Urban Development and Housing Act, "eviction or demolition shall be discouraged." That is the statement of policy. But immediately after that statement follows a list of exceptions to the general policy.

One of the exceptions is: (c) when there is a court order for eviction and demolition. Does Section 4 fall under exception (c)? For when the court issues a writ of demolition, in effect, there is a court order for demolition. In that way, therefore, we can reconcile these two measures.

**Senator Cayetano.** That is correct, Mr. President, and I would like to thank the lady senator for precisely pointing that out.

**Senator Defensor Santiago.** Thank you, Mr. President. Now, I would like to proceed to Section 7, pages 3 and 4.

Section 7 provides the procedures for the bidding and awarding of contracts and then it goes on to provide the remedy for the aggrieved party. The remedy apparently lies with the Office of the President. The obvious question is: Is the complainant or the party aggrieved by the bidding and awarding procedure limited to the procedure set out by Section 7 in appealing his case? In other words, to put it in another way, does the administrative system of appeal preclude a judicial system of appeal?

**Senator Cayetano.** No, Mr. President. After the President shall have ruled on whether or not the complaint or appeal to his Office is valid and the complainant is not happy, there is always, as we all know, the Supreme Court where the decision of the Office of the President can always be subject to *certiorari* proceedings. So, there is still a one-step farther that the complainant may pursue in the event that he is not happy at all with the decision of the Office of the President.

**Senator Defensor Santiago.** I agree with this position since it is not possible and it is not tenable that the jurisdiction of our judiciary should be reduced or even completely taken away by mere implication from a provision in a new law. Therefore, I join the distinguished sponsor in placing on the record that this provision is not intended to deprive the courts of jurisdiction. And may I add the observation that perhaps, just to avoid any unnecessary litigation in the future, a paragraph might be added to this section indicating that there is no intention to deprive the courts of jurisdiction.

**Senator Cayetano.** I agree with that proposition, Mr. President.

**Senator Defensor Santiago.** Thank you, Mr. President.

I am now proceeding to Section 8, still on page 4. Section 8 prohibits the issuance of temporary restraining orders and of preliminary injunctions. Is this prohibition meant to prevent the Supreme Court from future exercise of its own powers to amend the *Rules of Court*?

**Senator Cayetano.** No, Mr. President. As earlier stated, the Supreme Court, together with the Legislative Body, has equal power to amend, revise or even adopt new provisions of the *Rules of Court*. So, in the end, the Supreme Court may well come up with another rule contradictory to this particular provision.

**Senator Defensor Santiago.** Yes, I agree with this position. It seems to me that the last in point of time to amend the *Rules of Court* will prevail considering that there are two agencies given this power—the Supreme Court and Congress. So today, the Congress amends the *Rules of Court* so as to prohibit the issuance of TRO's under certain conditions, but tomorrow the Supreme Court may conceivably avail of its own power to amend the *Rules* so as to overthrow the legislative enactment.

**Senator Cayetano.** That is quite true, Mr. President. But I do hope, however, that the Supreme Court, in view of the past circulars issued by the Supreme Court and more recently Administrative Order Circular No. 07-99 dated June 25, 1999 and signed by Chief Justice Hilario B. Davide Jr. reiterates the need for lower court judges to observe PD No. 1818. And in view further of the latest case upholding the validity of PD No. 1818 in the case of *Garcia vs. Burgos*, 299 SCRA 546; 1998, I believe the Supreme Court will probably not adopt any contrary provision in the *Rules of Court* on this matter. At least, I believe, in the short term that the court will be consistent in upholding. If it has already upheld PD No. 1818 several times over, I do not see any reason in the short time—so to speak—why the Supreme Court will issue a contrary circular or rules to overturn the provision of this bill in Section 8.

**The President.** With the permission of my colleagues on the floor. Could Section 8 not be interpreted as a definition of the jurisdiction of the lower courts and not merely a revision of the *Rules of Procedure* so that, in effect, this should stand scrutiny in terms of defining the jurisdiction of the lower court? May I know the view of the sponsor?

**Senator Cayetano.** Mr. President, that is probably one other view. But I think the most persuasive view is that this is not just a limitation on the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. As we all know, the issuance of preliminary injunction—which is basically, in most cases, a provisional remedy except where there is a main action—is really in aid of the jurisdiction of the court.

**The President.** It is not a limitation on the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court but a limitation on the jurisdiction of the lower courts. We are not limiting the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

The point I am raising is: Is it possible that Section 8 can be interpreted as an exercise of the legislative power to define the jurisdiction of the lower courts which is authorized under the Constitution? May I have the pleasure of the opinion of Sen. Miriam Defensor Santiago.

**Senator Defensor Santiago.** I agree with the view of the distinguished Senate President since Section 8 specifically provides "No court except the Supreme Court." Therefore, Section 8 is extraneous to the issue of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and addresses directly only the issue of the jurisdiction of lower courts. The Senate President has correctly, I believe, interpreted this section.

May I please proceed to the last paragraph of this section. It provides:

Any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction issued in violation hereof is hereby declared void and of no force and effect.

This provision looks to the future. It looks to future TROs and allied issuances of a court, and even at this point when these have not yet materialized, when no application has been filed and no TRO has been issued, it declares these already void and of no force and effect.

I have no serious objection to this statement, except that it seems to me premature, and it seems to me that it might be accused of exceeding the line drawn between legislative and judicial powers. Only the judiciary has the power to declare any statutory enactment or any action of other branches of government as void and of no force and effect. And at worst, this provision would simply be an extraneous provision. That is to say, it would have no effect, and it would serve no purpose. If it stays here, it would not wreak any mischief, but at the same time, it would not serve any purpose.

I wonder if I may just request the technical working group to spend time to study whether there is a necessity for retaining this provision, or whether it can be withdrawn or eliminated without prejudice to the rest of this bill. So, I am not raising a question but requesting a deeper consideration of the necessity for including this provision in this bill.

**Senator Cayetano.** The observations of the lady senator from Iloilo City will be taken into consideration by the committee, and I would like to thank her for that, Mr. President.

**Senator Defensor Santiago.** I would also like to thank the gentleman. My last question concerns the penal provisions on page 5, Section 9, subparagraph (a). It provides:

A judge who shall issue a restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction, contrary to Section 8 hereof, shall suffer the penalty of suspension for sixty (60) days, without prejudice to any administrative, civil, or criminal liabilities he might also incur.

The Penal Code, Article 204, punishes a judge by *prison mayor* and perpetual absolute disqualification for knowingly rendering unjust judgment.

In view of these two parallel provisions, one which is proposed by our instant bill, the other which is already found in the existing Penal Code, particularly Article 204, may I just raise this question: Are the additional penalties set by our proposed law proportional or might it be deemed excessive with respect to the offense that would have been committed?

**Senator Cayetano.** Mr. President, just a short statement before I answer the clarificatory question of the lady senator from Iloilo City. Heretofore, the Supreme Court has issued many circulars enjoining the lower court judges to observe the prohibition of PD No. 1818 vis-a-vis the prohibition to issue a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, et cetera.

As the lady senator pointed out earlier, in spite of these several administrative circulars by the Supreme Court, I am not quite aware that any particular judge who violated PD No. 1818, which incidentally has no penal provision in it, has been administratively disciplined, except, if I am not mistaken—and I am just guessing this, Mr. President—verbal warnings at most, has not been administratively suspended for violating the provision of PD No. 1818. Because, as I have said, there is no penal provision on that. That is the reason we have now provided in this bill a penal sanction for a judge who shall deliberately issue a TRO or a writ of preliminary injunction contrary to the provisions of this bill.

Yes, the provision of the Penal Code speaks of the criminal liability of a judge having rendered unjust decision. I would say that this provision now under consideration, which is Section 9, subparagraph (a), is not inconsistent with that nor is it an addition because this is purely administrative in nature.

**Senator Defensor Santiago.** I would think that the penal provision is criminal in nature, it criminalizes the prohibited act. My point is that, under existing law, the judge who commits the criminalized act is punished criminally. But our instant bill imposes, in addition to criminal penalties, also civil penalties for administrative penalties are always available in any proceeding against any public official. So, the only difference

between this provision of our bill and existing law is that it imposes civil liabilities. This means that the aggrieved party can go to court and seek redress in the form of damages against the errant judge. Is that the contemplation?

**Senator Cayetano.** In addition to that, Mr. President, the bill contemplates precisely an administrative sanction of suspension for 60 days. The reason being, as we all know, it is so difficult to sue a judge criminally for having violated or for having rendered unjust decision. But as far as imposing an administrative penalty of 60 days is concerned, it would be much easier. This is the reason for this.

**Senator Defensor Santiago.** And just for the record, does this mean that when a judge issues a TRO contrary to the provisions of this section, the aggrieved party is allowed to bring a civil case for damages against the judge?

**Senator Cayetano.** There is no doubt about that Mr. President. The criminal liability of a judge—of any person for that matter, including a judge—may or may not carry with it civil liabilities under the Civil Code. So, it does not preclude any civil aspect or rather civil damages that a judge may incur in view of violating this provision.

**Senator Defensor Santiago.** Thank you. I thought so. That is all with this bill, Mr. President. I thank the distinguished sponsor.

**Senator Cayetano.** I would like to thank the lady senator for such an exhaustive clarificatory interpellation. Certainly, we will make a point that all observations and other notable statements here will find their way in the final version of this bill during the period of amendments.

Thank you, Mr. President.

**Senator Sotto.** Mr. President.

**The President.** The Majority Leader is recognized.

#### SUSPENSION OF CONSIDERATION OF S. NO. 2038

**Senator Sotto.** Mr. President, Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile has expressed his intention and desire to interpellate the sponsor of this bill. Therefore, I move that we suspend consideration of Senate Bill No. 2038.

**The President.** Is there any objection? *[Silence]* There being none, the motion is approved.

#### SPECIAL ORDERS

**Senator Sotto.** Mr. President, I move that we transfer from the Calendar for Ordinary Business to the Calendar for Special

Orders, Committee Report No. 218 on Senate Bill No. 1989, entitled

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE PROTECTION OF LAYOUT DESIGNS (TOPOGRAPHIES) OF INTEGRATED CIRCUITS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED EIGHTY TWO HUNDRED AND NINETY THREE (R.A. 8293), OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

**The President.** Is there any objection? *[Silence]* There being none, the motion is approved.

#### BILL ON SECOND READING

##### S. No. 1989 -- Protecting the Layout Design of Integrated Circuits

**Senator Sotto.** Mr. President, I move that we consider Senate Bill No. 1989 as reported out under Committee Report No. 218.

**The President.** Is there any objection? *[Silence]* There being none, the motion is approved.

Consideration of Senate Bill No. 1989 is now in order. With the permission of the Body, the Secretary will read only the title of the bill without prejudice to inserting in the *Record* the whole text thereof.

**The Secretary.** Senate Bill No. 1989, entitled

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE PROTECTION OF LAYOUT DESIGNS (TOPOGRAPHIES) OF INTEGRATED CIRCUITS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED EIGHTY TWO HUNDRED AND NINETY THREE (R.A. 8293), OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

*The following is the whole text of the bill:*

Senate Bill No. 1989

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE PROTECTION OF LAYOUT DESIGNS (TOPOGRAPHIES) OF INTEGRATED CIRCUITS, AMENDING FOR